Sandusky County
Page 520
SANDUSKY COUNTY was formed from old an Indian territory, April 1, 1820. The soil is fertile, and the surface is generally level. The Black Swamp tract covers the western part. Its first settlers were principally of New England origin, since which many have moved in from Pennsylvania and Germany. The principal productions are Indian corn, wheat, oats, potatoes and pork. Area about 440 square miles. In 1887 the acres cultivated were 143,122; in pasture, 19,884; woodland, 37,797; lying waste, 3,917; produced in wheat, 732,798 bushels; rye, 20,464; buckwheat, 981; oats, 552,467; barley, 11,756; corn, 1,184,723; broom corn, 300 lbs. brush; meadow hay, 18,445 tons; clover hay, 12,077; potatoes, 120,055 bushels; butter, 710,754 lbs.; cheese, 53,200; sorghum, 1,878 gallons; maple syrup, 3,105 gallons; honey, 4,296 lbs.; eggs, 508,110 dozen; grapes, 37,540 lbs.; wine, 593 gallons; sweet potatoes, 655 bushels; apples, 52,203; peaches, 6,146; pears, 1,507; wool, 148,219 lbs.; milch cows owned, 5,481. Ohio Mining Statistics, 1888.–Limestone, 18,600 tons burned for lime, 8,250 cubic feet of dimension stone, 3,526 cubic yards of building stone, 6,353 cubic yards of ballast or macadam. School census, 1888, 9,446; teachers, 287. Miles of railroad track, 141.
Township
And Census |
1840 |
1880 |
Township
And Census |
1840 |
1880 |
Township
And Census |
1840 |
1880 |
Ballville |
1,007 |
1,652 |
Rice |
385 |
949 |
Townsend |
692 |
1,697 |
Fremont (City) |
|
8,456 |
Riley |
426 |
1,621 |
Washington |
1,074 |
2,608 |
Green Creek |
1,186 |
4,495 |
Sandusky |
1,696 |
1,785 |
Woodville |
486 |
1,662 |
Jackson |
929 |
1,485 |
Scott |
684 |
1,452 |
York |
1,301 |
2,319 |
Madison |
316 |
1,886 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Population of Sandusky in 1830, 2,851; 1840, 10,184; 1860, 21,429; 1880, 32,057; of whom 22,312 were born in Ohio; 2,247 Pennsylvania; 1,474 New York; 181 Indiana; 140 Virginia; 42 Kentucky; 2,653 German Empire; 569 Ireland; 373 England and Wales; 207 British America; 197 France; 34 Scotland, and 5 Norway and Sweden. Census, 1890, 30,617.
The significance of the name of this county has frequently been a matter of dispute. John H. JAMES, Esq., the American Pioneer, truly says:
I have a note of a conversation
with William WALKER at
Columbus, in 1835-6, at which time he was principal chief of the Wyandots at Upper Sandusky, in
which I asked the meaning of
the word Sandusky. He
said it meant “at
the cold water,” and should be sounded San-doos-tee.
He said it “carried with it the force of a
preposition.” The
Upper Cold Water and
the Lower Cold Water, then, were descriptive Indian names, given long
before
the presence of the trader SOWDOWSKY.
In
the vocabulary of Wyandot words, given by John JOHNSTON, Esq., formerly
Indian
agent in Ohio, as printed in Archaelogia
Americana,
vol. i., page 295, the word
water is given as Sa,
undustee,
or water within water pools.
This region of country was once a favorite residence of the Indians. Hon. Lewis CASS, in his discourse before the Historical Society of Michigan, delivered September 18, 1829, gives some interesting statements respecting a tribe called “the Neutral Nation.”
Page 521
Designed and
Engraved in 1846 by A. H. Ritchie for 1st
Edition Ohio Historical
Collection.
REPULSE OF THE BRITISH BEFORE FORT
STEPHENSON.
“COL. SHORT,
commanding the regulars composing the forlorn hope, was ordering his
met to
leap the ditch, hoisted his handkerchief on the end of his sword, and
begged
for that mercy which he had the moment before ordered should be denied
to his
enemy.”
Page 522
Upon the Sandusky river, and
near where the town of Lower Sandusky now stands, lived a band of Wyandots, called the Neutral
Nation. They
occupied two villages, which were cities
of refuge, where those who sought safety never failed to find it. During the long and
disastrous contests which
preceded and followed the arrival of the Europeans, in which the
Iroquois
contended for victory, and their enemies for existence, this little
band
preserved the integrity of their territories and the sacred character
of
peace-makers. All
who met upon their
threshold met as friends, for the ground on which they stood was holy. It was a beautiful
institution, a calm and
peaceful island looking out upon a world of waves and tempests.
This annexed is a note from the
above.
This Neutral Nation, so-called by
Father SEGUARD, was
still in existence two centuries ago, when the French missionaries
first
reached the upper lakes. The
details of
their history, and of their character and privileges, are meagre
and unsatisfactory; and this is the more to be regretted, as such a
sanctuary
among the barbarous tribes is not only a singular institution, but
altogether
at variance with that reckless spirit of cruelty with which their wars
are
usually prosecuted. The
Wyandot
tradition represents them as having separated from the parent stock
during the
bloody wars between their own tribe and the Iroquois, and having fled
to the
Sandusky river for
safety. That they
here erected two forts, within a
short distance of each other, and assigned one to the Iroquois and the
other to
the Wyandotts and their
allies, where their war
parties might find security and hospitality, whenever they entered
their
country. Why so
unusual a proposition
was made and acceded to, tradition does not tell.
It is probable, however, that superstition
lent its aid to the institution, and that it may have been indebted for
its
origin to the feasts and dreams and juggling ceremonies which
constituted the
religion of the aborigines. No
other
motive was sufficiently powerful to restrain the hand of violence and
to
counteract the threat of vengeance.
An intestine feud finally arose in
this Neutral
Nation, one party espousing the cause of the Iroquois and the other of
their
enemies; and like most civil wars, this was prosecuted with relentless
fury. Our informant
says that, since his
recollection, the remains of a red cedar post were yet to be seen,
where the
prisoners were tied previously to being burned.
The informant above alluded to by
Gov. CASS we have
reason to believe was Major B. F. STICKNEY, of Toledo, long an Indian
agent in
this region. That
there may have been
such a tradition among the Indians we are unable to gainsay, but of its
truth
we have doubts. Major
STICKNEY, in a
lecture (as yet unpublished), delivered Feb. 28, 1845, before the Young
Men’s
Association, of Toledo, says:
“The remains of extensive
works of defence
are now to be seen near Lower Sandusky.
The Wyandotts
have given me this account of
them. At a period
of two centuries and a
half since, or more, all the Indians west of this point were at war
with all
the Indians east. Two
walled towns were
built near each other, and each was inhabited by those of Wyandott
origin. They
assumed a neutral
character, and the Indians at war recognized that character. They might be called two
neutral cities. All
of the west might enter the western city,
and all of the east the
eastern. The
inhabitants of one city might inform
those of the other that war parties were there or had been there; but
who they
were or whence they came, or any thing more, must not be mentioned. The war parties might
remain there in
security, taking their own time for departure.
At the western town they suffered the warriors to burn
their prisoners
near it; but the eastern would not. (An old Wyandott
informed me that he recollected seeing, when a boy, the remains of a
cedar-post
or stake, at which they used to burn prisoners.)
The French historians tell us that these
neutral cities were inhabited and their neutral character respected,
when they
first came here. At
length a quarrel
arose between the two cities, and one destroyed the inhabitants of the
other. This put an
end to all neutrality.”
Fremont in 1846.—Lower Sandusky [now Fremont], the county-seat, is twenty-four miles southwesterly from Sandusky city, and 105 west of north from Columbus. The annexed engraving shows the town as it appears from a hill northeast of it, on the opposite side of the river, near the residence of Mr. Jasper SMITH, seen in front. On the left the bridge across the Sandusky river partially appears, and a little to the right of it WHYLER’s hotel. On the hill are shown the court-house, and the Episcopal, Presbyterian and Catholic churches.
The town stands at the head of navigation on the Sandusky, at the lower rapids, where the Indians had a reservation of two miles square, granted to them by the treaty of Greenville. It is said that at an early day the French had a trading-station at this point. Lower Sandusky contains 1 Episcopal, 1 Presbyterian, 1 Baptist, 1 Methodist and 1 Catholic church, 2 newspaper printing-offices, 8 grocery and 11 dry goods stores, 1 woollen factory, 1 foundry, and had, in 1840, 1,117 inhabitants, and now has near 2,000. It is a thriving town, and consider-
Page 523
able business is carried on. Its commerce is increasing. Small steamers and sail vessels constantly ply from here. The principal articles of export in 1846 were of wheat 90,000 bushels; pork, 560 barrels; ashes, 558 casks; flour, 1,010 barrels; corn, 18,400 bushels; staves, 1,100,000; imports, 1,480 barrels of salt and 250 tons of merchandize. Immediately opposite Lower Sandusky, on the east bank of the river, is the small village of Croghansville, laid out in 1817, which in a general description would be included in the former.—Old Edition.
A REMINISCENCE.
A young man said to me on my original tour, in one of the interior towns, “There is an odd character here you ought to see. He writes humorous verses, is much of a wit, and is deserving of a place in your book.” I replied, “Ohio has a good many odd people, and I have not time to give them all a call.” The young man eventually moved to Cincinnati, became a member of it literary club, and I was associated with him for years, and learned to love and respect him. He was one of its most popular members, overflowing with good fellowship, cheery, fond of the humorous, and never known to get angry except in indignation at some vile project in view, or some oppressive act committed upon the weak and helpless. In those days there was nobody around to tell him that he was to become three times Governor of Ohio and then President of the United States—RUTHERFORD B. HAYES.
I now regret that I did not see that shrewd character, Judge Elisha W. HOWLAND, that he wanted me to call upon; but I here, at this late day, pay my respects to his memory.
Two or three years after my visit the name of the town was changed from Lower Sandusky to Fremont, in honor not of a then political character, but of the great Path Finder over “the Rockies.” Mr. HAYES, as the lawyer for the petition, presented it to court, and finished by offering the only remonstrance against the change. This was in the form of humorous versification, consisting of seven verses from Judge HOWLAND, which Mr. Hayes read to the court, and I have no doubt with a gusto.
A
REMONSTRANCE against a Petition to the County
Court of
Sandusky to alter the name of Lower Sandusky to that of Fremont, as
read to the
Court by MR. R. B. HAYES, Attorney
for the Petition.
There is a prayer now going round
Which I dislike to hear, To change the name of this old town
I hold very dear. They pray the court to alter it,
I pray to God they wont; And let it stand Sandusky yet
And not John C.
Fremont. Sandusky is a pleasant name; ‘Tis
short and easy spoken; Descending to us by a chain
That never should be broken. |
Then let us hand it down the stream
Of Time to after ages, And Sandusky be the theme
Of future bards and sages. Wont the old honest
SAGUMS’ rise,
And say to us pale
faces, “Do you our ancient name
despise,
And change our resting-places? “Our fathers slumbered
here;
Their spirits cry, “Oh, don’t Alter the name to us so dear
And substitute Fremont!’” |
Therefore
my prayer shall still remain,
Until my voice grows husky: Oh, change the PEOPLE, not the name
Of my old home, Sandusky! |
Fort Stevenson or Sandusky, so gallantly defended by Col. CROGHAN, on the 2d of August, 1813, against an overwhelming force of British and Indians, was within the present limits of the place. Its site is indicated by the flag on the left
Page 524
Top
Picture
Drawn by
Henry Howe in 1846
Bottom
Picture
BIRCHARD LIBRARY AND
SOLDIERS’
MONUMENT.
On the site of Fort Stephenson,
Fremont.
Page 525
in the engraving, which is about thirty rods southeast of the court-house, on high ground, much elevated above the river. The fort enclosed about an acre of ground, and the picketing was in good preservation as late as 1834. We annex a narration of the assault on the fort from a published source.
British
Manoeuvres.—Having
raised the siege of Camp Meigs,
the British sailed
round into Sandusky bay, while a competent number of their savage
allies
marched across through the swamps of Portage river, to cooperate in a
combined
attack on Lower Sandusky, expecting, no doubt, that Gen.
Harrison’s attention
would be chiefly directed to Forts Winchester and Meigs.
The general, however, had calculated on their
taking this course, and had been careful to keep patrols down the bay,
opposite
the mouth of Portage, where he supposed their forces would debark.
Retreat
Ordered.—Several
days before the
British had invested Fort Meigs,
Gen. Harrison, with
Major CROGHAN and some other officers, had examined the heights which
surround
Fort Stevenson: and as the hill on the opposite or southeast side of
the river
was found to be the most commanding eminence, the general had some
thoughts of
removing the fort to that place, and Major CROGHAN declared his
readiness to
undertake the work. But
the general did
not authorize him to do it, as he believed that if the enemy intended
to invade
our territory again, they would do it before the removal could be com-
FORT
SANDUSKY AND ENVIRONS: SCALE, 200 YARDS TO THE
INCH.
[References to the
Environs.—a—British gun-boats at their place of
landing.
b—Cannon, a six-pounder. c—Mortar.
D—Batteries e—Graves of Lieut-Col.
Short and Lieut. Gordon, who fell
in
the ditch.
f—Road
to Upper Sandusky.
g—Advance of the enemy to the fatal
ditch. i—Head of
navigation.
FORT
SANDUSKY
References
to the Fort.—Line 1—Pickets. Line
2—Embankments
from the ditch to and against
the pickets.
Line
–Dry ditch, nine feet wide by
six deep.
A.—Block-house first attached by can-
one, b. b—Bastion from which
the ditch was
raked by Croghan’s
artillery. C.—Guard
block-
house, in the lower left corner. D—Hospital
during the attack. EEE—Military
store-houses,
F—Commissary’s
store-house. G—Magazine.
H—Fort gate. K
K K—Wicker gates.
L—Par-
tition page.
pleted.
It was
finally concluded that the fort, which was calculated for a garrison of
only
200 men, could not be defended against the heavy artillery of the
enemy; and
that if the British should approach it by water, artillery, the fort
must be
abandoned and burnt, provided a retreat could be effected with safety. In the orders left with
Major CROGHAN it was
stated, “Should the British troops approach you in force with
cannon, and you
can discover them in time to effect
a retreat, you
will do so immediately, destroying all the public stores.”
“You must be aware that
the attempt to retreat in the
face of an Indian force would be vain.
Against such an enemy your garri-
Page 526
son would be safe, however great the
number.”
A
Counsel of
War.—On
the evening of the 29th
Gen. Harrison received intelligence, by express, from Gen. Clay, that
the enemy
had abandoned the siege of Fort Meigs;
and as the
Indians on that day had swarmed in the woods round his camp, he
entertained no
doubt but that an immediate attack was intended either on Sandusky or
Seneca. He
therefore immediately called
a council of war, consisting of McArthur, Cass, Ball, Paul, Wood, Hukill, Holmes and Graham, who
were unanimously of the
opinion that Fort Stephenson was untenable against heavy artillery, and
that as
the enemy could bring with facility any quantity of battering cannon
against
it, by which it must inevitably fall, and as it was an unimportant
post,
containing nothing the loss of which would be felt by us, that the
garrison should
therefore not be reinforced but withdrawn, and the place destroyed.
A
Retreat
Unsafe.—In
the pursuance of this
decision the general immediately despatched
the order
to Major CROGHAN, directing him immediately to abandon Fort Stephenson,
to set
it on fire and repair with his command to headquarters—cross
the river and come
up on the opposite side, and if he should find it impracticable to
reach the
general’s quarters, to take the road to Huron, and pursue it
with the utmost
circumspection and despatch. This order was sent by Mr.
CONNER and two
Indians, who lost their way in the dark, and did not reach Fort
Stephenson till
eleven o’clock the next day.
When Maj.
CROGHAN received it, he was of the opinion that he could not then
retreat with
safety, as the Indians were hovering round the fort in considerable
force. He called a
council of his officers, a
majority of whom
coincided with him in the opinion
that a retreat would be unsafe, and that the post could be maintained
against
the enemy, at least until further instructions could be received from
headquarters. The
major therefore
immediately returned the following answer: “Sir,
I have just received yours of yesterday, 10 o’clock
P.M., ordering me to
destroy this place and make good my retreat, which was received too
late to be
carried into execution. We
have
determined to maintain this place, and by heavens we can.”
In writing this note, Major CROGHAN
had a view to the
probability of its falling into the hands of the enemy, and on that
account
made use of stronger language than would have been consistent with
propriety. It
reached the general on the
same day, who did not fully understand the circumstances and motives
under
which it had been dictated. The
following order was therefore immediately prepared, and sent with Col.
Wells in
the morning, escorted by Col. Ball, with his corps of dragoons:
“July 30, 1813.
“Sir—The
general has just received your letter of this
date, informing him that you had thought proper to disobey the order
issued
from this office, and delivered to you this morning.
It appears tat the information which dictated
the order was incorrect; and as you did not receive it in the night, as
was
expected, it might have been proper that you should have reported the
circumstance and your situation before you proceeded to its execution. This might have been
passed over; but I am
directed to say to you, that an officer who presumes to aver that he
has made
his resolution, and that he will act in direct opposition to the orders
of his
general, can no longer be entrusted with a separate command. Colonel Wells is sent to
relieve you. You
will deliver the command to him, and
repair with Colonel Ball’s squadron to this place. By command, &
“A. H. HOLMES,
“Assistant Adjutant
General.”
Colonel Wells being left in the
command of Fort
Stevenson, Major Croghan
returned with his squadron
to headquarters. He
there explained his
motives for writing such a note, which were deemed satisfactory; and
having
remained all night with the general, who treated him politely, he was
permitted
to return to his command in the morning, with written orders similar to
those
he had received before.
Refusal
to
Surrender.—A
reconnoitering party
which had been sent from headquarters to the shore of the lake, about
twenty
miles distant from Fort Stephenson, discovered the approach of the
enemy, by
water, on the evening of the 31st of July. They returned by the fort
after 12 o’clock
the next day, and had passed it but a few hours when the enemy made
their
appearance before it. The
Indians showed
themselves first on the hill over the river, and were saluted by a six-pounder, the only piece of
artillery in the fort, which
soon caused them to retire. In
half an
hour the British gun-boats came in sight, and the Indian forces
displayed
themselves in every direction, with a view to intercept the garrison,
should a
retreat be attempted. The
six-pounder was fired a
few times at the gun-boats, which was
returned by the artillery of the enemy.
A landing of their troops with a five-and-a- half-inch
howitzer was effected
about a mile below the fort; and Major Chambers,
accompanied by Dickson, was dispatched towards the fort with a flag,
and was
met on the part of Major Croghan
by Ensign Shipp, of
the 17th regiment.
After the
usual ceremonies, Major Chambers observed to Ensign Shipp, that he was
instructed by General Proctor to demand the surrender of the fort, as
he was
anxious to spare the effusion of human blood, which he could not do,
should he
be under the necessity of reducing it, by the powerful force of
artillery,
regulars and Indians under his command.
Shipp replied, that the commandant of the fort and its
garrison were
determined to defend it to the last extremity; that no force however
great
could induce them to surrender, as they were resolved to maintain their
post,
or to bury themselves in its ruins.
Dickson then
Page 527
said that their immense body of Indians
could not be
restrained from murdering the whole garrison in case of success, of
which we
have no doubt, rejoined Chambers, as we are amply prepared. Dickson then proceeded to
remark that it was
a great pity so fine a young man should fall into the hands of the
savages—Sir,
for God’s sake, surrender, and prevent the dreadful massacre
that will be
caused by your resistance. It
will not
be given up while a man is able to resist.
An Indian at this moment came out of an adjoining ravine,
and advancing to the ensign, took hold of his sword and attempted to
wrest it
from him. Dickson
interfered, and having
restrained the Indian, affected great anxiety to get him safe into the
fort.
The
Enemy Open Fire. –The enemy now opened
their fire from their six-pounders
in the gun-boats and the howitzer on shore, which
they continued through the night with but little intermission and very
little
effect. The forces
of the enemy
consisted of 500 regulars, and about 800 Indians, commanded by Dickson,
the
whole being commanded by General Proctor in person.
Tecumseh was stationed on the road to Fort Meigs with a body of 2000
Indians, expecting to intercept a
reinforcement on that route.
Major Croghan
through the
evening occasionally fired his six-pounder,
at the
same time changing its place occasionally to induce a belief that he
had more
than one piece. As
it produced very
little execution on the enemy, and he was desirous of saving his
ammunition, he
soon discontinued his fire. The
enemy
had directed their fire against the northwestern angle of the fort
which
induced the commander to believe that an attempt to storm his works
would be
made at that point. In
the night,
Captain Hunter was directed to remove the six-pounder
to a block-house, from which it would rake that angle.
By great industry and personal exertion,
Captain Hunter soon accomplished this object in secrecy. The embrasure was masked,
and the piece
loaded with a half-charge of powder, and double charge of slugs and
grapeshot. Early in
the morning of the
2d, the enemy opened their fire from their howitzer and three six-pounders, which they had landed
in the night, and planted
in a point of woods, about 250 yards from the fort.
In the evening, about 4 o’clock, they
concentrated the fire of all their guns on their northwest angle, which
convinced Major Croghan
that they would endeavor to
make a breach and storm the works at that point; he therefore
immediately had
that place strengthened as much as possible with bags of flour and
sand, which
were so effectual that the picketing in that place sustained no
material
injury. Sergeant
Weaver, with five or
six gentlemen of the Petersburgh
volunteers and Pittburgh
blues, who happened to be in the fort, was intrusted
with the management of the six-pounder.
Assault
and
Repulse of the British.—Late in the
evening, when the smoke of the firing had completely enveloped the
fort, the
enemy proceeded to make the assault.
Two
feints were made towards the southern angle, where Captain
Hunter’s lines were
formed; and at the same time a column of 350 men was discovered
advancing
through the smoke, within twenty paces of the northwestern angle. A heavy galling fire of
musketry was now
opened upon them from the fort, which threw them into some confusion. Colonel Short, who headed
the principal
column, soon rallied his men, and led them with great bravery to the
brink of
the ditch. After a
momentary pause he
leaped into the ditch, calling to his men to follow him, and in a few
minutes it was
full. The masked
port-hole was now
opened, and the six-pounder,
at a distance of thirty
feet, poured such destruction among them that but a few who entered the
ditch
were fortunate enough to escape. A
precipitate and confused retreat was the immediate consequence,
although some
of the offices attempted to rally their men.
The other column, which was led by Colonel Warburton and
Major Cambers,
was also routed in confusion by a descructive
fire
from the line commanded by Captain Hunter.
The whole of them fled into the adjoining wood, beyond the
reach of our
fire-arms. During
the assault, which lasted half an
hour, the enemy kept up an incessant fire from
their howitzer and five six-pounders. They left Colonel Short,*
a lieutenant and
twenty five privates dead in the ditch; and the total number of
prisoners taken
was twenty-six, most of them badly wounded.
Major Muir was knocked down in the ditch, and lay among
the dead, til the
darkness of night enabled him to escape in
safety. The loss of
the garrison was one
killed and seven slightly wounded.
The
total loss of the enemy could not be less than 150 killed and wounded.
Retreat
of
the British.—When
night came on,
which was soon after the assault, the wounded in the ditch were in a desparate situation.
Complete relief could not be brought to them by either
side with any
degree of safety. Major
Croghan, however,
relieved them as much as possible—he
contrived to convey them water over the picketing in buckets, and a
ditch was
opened under the pickets, through which those who were able and
willing, were
encouraged to crawl into the fort.
All
who were able, preferred, of course, to follow their defeated comrades,
and
many others were carried from the vicinity of the fort by the Indians,
particularly their own killed and wounded; and in the night, about
three
o’clock, the whole British and Indian
________________________
* “Col. Short, who
commanded the regulars composing the
forlorn hope, was ordering his men to leap the ditch, cut down the
pickets, and
give the Americans no quarter, when he fell mortally wounded into the
ditch,
hoisted his white handkerchief on the end of his sword, and begged for
that
mercy which he had a moment before ordered to be denied to his
enemy.”
Page 528
force commenced a disorderly retreat. So great was their
precipitation that they
left a sail-boat containing some clothing and a considerable quantity
of
military stores: and on the next day, seventy stand
of
arms and some braces of pistols were picked up around the fort. Their hurry and confusion
were caused by the
apprehension of an attack from Gen. Harrison, of whose position and
force they
had probably received an exaggerated account.
Gen.
Harrison’s Movements.—It
was the intention of General Harrison, should the enemy
succeed against Fort Stephenson, or should they endeavor to turn his
left and
fall on Upper Sandusky, to leave his camp at Seneca and fall back for
the protection
of that place. But
he discovered by the
firing on the evening of the 1st, that the enemy
had nothing but
light artillery, which could make no impression on the fort; and he
knew that
an attempt to storm it without making a breach, could be successfully
repelled
by the garrison; he therefore determined to wait for the arrival of 250
mounted
volunteers under Colonel Rennick,
being the advance
of 700 who were approaching by the way of the Upper Sandusky, and then
to march
against the enemy and raise the siege, if their force was not still too
great
for his. On the 2d,
he sent several
scouts to ascertain their situation and force; but the woods were so
infested
with Indians, that none of them could proceed sufficiently near the
fort to
make the necessary discoveries. In
the
night the messenger arrived at headquarters with intelligence that the enemy were preparing to retreat. About 9 o’clock,
Major Croghan
had ascertained from their collecting about their boats, that
they were preparing to embark, and had immediately sent an express to
the
commander-in-chief with this information.
The General now determined to wait no longer for the
reinforcements, and
immediately set out with the dragoons, with which he reached the fort
early in
the morning, having ordered Generals M’Arthur
and
Cass, who had arrived at Seneca several days before, to follow him with
all the
disposable infantry at that place, and which at this time was about 700
men,
after the numerous sick, and the force necessary to maintain the
position, were
left behind. Finding
that the enemy had
fled entirely from the fort, so as not to be reached by him, and
learning that
Tecumseh was somewhere in the direction of Fort Meigs,
with 2,000 warriors, he immediately ordered the infantry to fall back
to
Seneca, lest Tecumseh should make an attack on that place, or intercept
the
small reinforcements advancing from Ohio.
Gallant
Soldiers.—In
his official report of this affair, General Harrison observes
that—“It will not
be among the least of General Proctor’s mortifications that
he has been baffled
by a youth who had just passed his twenty-first year.
He is, however, a hero worthy of his gallant
uncle, Gen. George R. Clarke.”
Captain Hunter, of the 17th
regiment, the
second in command, conducted himself with great propriety: and never
was there
a set of finer young fellows than the subalterns, viz.: Lieutenants
Johnson and
Baylor of the 17th, Meeks of the 7th,
and Ensigns Shipp
and Duncan of the 17th.
Lieutenant Anderson of the 24th,
was also noticed for his good conduct.
Being without a command, he solicited Major Croghan
for a musket and a post to fight at, which he did with the greatest
bravery.
“Too much
praise,” says Major Croghan, “cannot be bestowed
on the officers, non-commissioned officers and privates under my
command, for
their gallantry and good conduct during the siege.”
The brevet rant of
lieutenant-colonel was immediately
conferred on Major Croghan,
by the president of the
United States, for his gallant conduct on this occasion. The ladies of Chilicothe
also presented him an elegant sword, accompanied by a suitable address.
We take the above from Dawson’s “Life of Harrison,” where it is quoted from some other source. In defending Gen. Harrison from the charges of cowardice and incompetency in not marching to the aid of the garrison precious to the attack, Dawson says;
Unjust
Criticism of General Harrison.—The
conduct of the gallant Croghan
and his garrison received from every quarter the plaudits of their
countrymen. This
was what they most
richly deserved. There
was, however,
some jealous spirits, who took it into their heads to be dissatisfied
with the
course pursued by the commanding general.
The order which was given to Colonel Croghan
to evacuate and destroy the garrison previously to the attack, was
loudly
condemned, as well as the decision of the council of war, to fall back
with the
troops then at Seneca, to a position twelve miles in the rear. Both these measures, it
has been said, were detirmined
on by the unanimous advice of the council of
war. It is not to
be presumed that such
men as composed that board, would have given advice which was in any
way
derogatory to the honor of the American arms.
Every individual among them either had, before or
afterwards,
distinguished himself by acts of daring courage and intrepidity. We do not profess to be
much acquainted with
military matters, but the subject appears to us so
plain as only to require a small portion of common sense perfectly to
comprehend it. At
the time that the
determination was made to withdraw the garrison from Sandusky, it must
be
recollected that the general had only with him at Seneca about 400
infantry and
130 or 140 dragoons. The
enemy, as he
was informed by General
Page 529
Clay in the letter brought by
Captain M’Cune,
amounted to at least 5,000. With
such a disparity of force, would it have
been proper to have risked an action to preserve the post of Lower
Sandusky,
which of itself was of little or no importance, and which, the garrison
being
withdrawn, contained nothing of any value?
Important
Posts.—The posts of Fort Meigs and Upper Sandusky were of
the utmost importance; the
former was amply provided with the means of defence,
and was in no danger; but the latter, weak in its defences,
and with a feeble garrison, containing many thousands of barrels of
flour and
other provisions, the sole resource of the army for the ensuing
campaign, was
to be preserved at any risk. The
position at Seneeca, was not in the direct line from
Fort Meigs
to Upper Sandusky. The
enemy, by taking
the direct route, would certainly reach it before General Harrison, as
several
hours must have elapsed before he could have been informed of their
movement,
even if it had been discovered the moment it had been commenced, a
circumstance
not very likely to happen. It
therefore
became necessary for the security of Upper Sandusky, that a position
better
adapted to that purpose should be assumed.
There was another and most important reason for this
movement: twelve
miles in the rear of Seneca, towards Upper Sandusky, the prairie or
open
country commences. The
infantry which
the commander-in-chief had with him were raw recruits; on the contrary,
the squadron of dragoons were
well disciplined, and had seen
much service. In
the country about
Seneca, this important corps could have been of little service: in the
open
country to the rear, they would have defeated five times their number
of
Indians. It was for
these reasons that
it was determined by the council of war, to change the position of the
troops
at Seneca. If this
movement did take
place, the propriety of withdrawing the garrison of Lower Sandusky was
obvious. The place
was extremely weak,
and in a bad position. It
was not
intended originally for a fort. Before
the war it was used as the United States’ Indian factory, and
had a small
stockade around it, merely for the purpose of keeping out drunken
Indians. It was,
moreover, commanded by a hill, within
point blank shot, on the opposite side of the river.
“The
School of Experience.”—To
those who suppose that Gen. Harrison should have advanced upon the
enemy the
moment he discovered that Sandusky was attacked, we must, in the
language of
the general and field officers who were present on the occasion,
“leave them to
correct their opinions in the school of experience.” General Harrison had been
reinforced a day or
two before the siege of Sandusky, by the 28th
regiment, raised in
Kentucky. After
having received this
corps he could not have marched more than 800 effective men without
risking his
stores, and what was still of more consequence, 150 sick at Seneca, to
be taken
by the smallest party of Indians.
The
scouts of the army brought information that the Indians were very
numerous in
the direction of Fort Meigs. The general conjectured
that a large portion
of the Indians were then ready to fall on his flank or rear, or the defenceless camp at Seneca,
should he advance. The
information he received from the British
prisoners confirmed this opinion; a body of 2,000 being there under the
command
of Tecumseh. At the
moment of which we
are speaking the volunteers of Ohio were rapidly approaching.
Wise
Course
of Gen. Harrison.—Now, under these
circumstances, does any reasonable man believe that Gen. Harrison
should have
advanced with his 800 raw recruits against a force in front which he
knew to be
so much superior in numbers, and with the probability of having one
equally
large hanging on his flank? What
would
have been thought of his abilities as a general, even if he had been
successful
against Gen. Proctor (of which, with his small force, there was little
probability), if in his absence Tecumseh, with his 2,000 warriors, had
rushed
upon Camp Seneca, destroyed his stores, tomahawked his sick soldiers,
and
pursuing his route towards Upper Sandusky, defeated the Ohio
volunteers,
scattered as they were in small bodies, and finally ending his career
with the
destruction of the grand magazine of his army, upon the preservation of
which
all his hopes of future success depended?
In all human probability this would have been the result
had Gen.
Harrison advanced to the relief of Fort Stephenson sooner than he did. It was certainly better to
risk for a while
the defence of that
fort to the talents and vigor of Croghan,
and the gallant spirits who were with him, than to
jeopardize the whole prospects of the campaign.
About one and a half miles above Lower
Sandusky, at the falls of
the river, in the manufacturing village of Ballsville,
containing one cotton and one woollen
factory, two flouring
mills, and about thirty dwellings.
It was about half a mile southwest of this village, that
Col. Ball had a
skirmish with the Indians a day or two previous to the assault of Fort
Stephenson. There
is, or was a few years
since, an oak tree on the site of the
action, on the road to Columbus, with seventeen hacks in it to indicate
the
number of Indians killed on the occasion.
We have an account of this affair derived from one of the
dragoons
present.—Old Edition.
The squadron were moving towards
the fort when they
were suddenly fired upon by the Indians from the west side of the road,
whereupon Col. Ball ordered a charge, and he