Homepage

 

Visit the Descendant’s Registry

Adams | Allen | Ashland | Ashtabula | Athens | Auglaize | Belmont | Brown | Butler | Carroll | Champaign | Clark | Clermont Clinton | Columbiana | Coshocton | Crawford | Cuyahoga | Darke | Defiance | Delaware | Erie | Fairfield | Fayette | Franklin Fulton | Gallia | Geauga | Greene | Guernsey Hamilton | Hancock | Hardin | Harrison | Henry | Highland | Hocking Holmes Huron | Jackson | Jefferson | Knox | Lake | Lawrence | Licking | Logan | Lorain | Lucas | Madison | Mahoning | Marion Medina | Meigs | Mercer | Miami | Monroe | Montgomery | Morgan | Morrow | Muskingum | Noble | Ottawa | Paulding | Perry Pickaway | Pike | Portage | Preble | Putnam | Richland | Ross | Sandusky | Scioto | Seneca | Shelby | Stark | Summit | Trumbull Tuscarawas | Union | Van Wert | Vinton | Warren | Washington | Wayne | Wood | Wyandot

Historical Collections of Ohio

By Henry Howe

Vol. II

©1888

 

WOOD COUNTY

 

Page 858

 

WOOD COUNTY was formed from old Indian Territory, and named from the brave and chivalrous Col. WOOD, a distinguished officer of engineers in the war of 1812.  The surface is level, and covered by the black swamp, the soil of which is a rich, black loam, and very fertile, and peculiarly well adapted to grazing.  The population are mainly of New England descent, with some Germans.  The principal crops are corn, hay, potatoes, oats and wheat.

 

Area, about 620 square miles.  In 1887 the acres cultivated were 167,492; in pasture, 26,485; woodland, 65,055; lying waste, 1,059; produced in wheat, 661,013 bushels; rye, 104,379 (largest in the State); buckwheat, 1,560; oats, 815,896; barley, 27,080; corn, 1,884,832; meadow hay, 21,000 tons;  clover, 6,095; flaxseed, 84 bushels; potatoes, 88,656; tobacco, 70 lbs.; butter, 635,765; sorghum, 2,274 gallons; maple syrup, 4,873; honey, 21,140 lbs.; eggs, 749,213 dozen; grapes, 56,220 lbs.; wine, 962 gallons; sweet potatoes, 21 bushels; apples, 39,660; peaches, 1,383; pears, 1,537; wool, 83,799 lbs.; milch cows owned, 8,481.  Ohio Mining Statistics, 1888: Limestone, 36,565 tons burned for lime; 81,000 cubic feet of dimension stone; 57,199 cubic yards of building stone; 8,892 cubic feet of ballast or macadam.  School census, 1888, 12,763; teachers, 410.  Miles of railroad track, 196.

 

 

 

Population of Wood in 1830, 1,096; 1840, 5,458; 1850, 9,165; 1860, 17,886; 1880, 34,022: of whom 25,808 were born in Ohio; 1,569, Pennsylvania; 1204, New York; 169, Virginia; 158 Indiana; 38, Kentucky; 2092, German Empire; 626 England and Wales; 321, British America; 274 Ireland; 118, France; 110, Scotland; and 21, Norway and Sweden.  Census, 1890, 44,392.

 

DRAINAGE.

 

Since our original edition of 1847 few counties of the State have been so surprisingly transformed as Wood.  It was then an almost unbroken forest, covering the black swamp, and with few inhabitants.  This advance has been owning to the very extensive system of draining and clearing off the forest, which has brought a large body of agriculturalists to settle up the country, three-fourths of whom are, to-day, within a radius of about 2 ½ miles of some line of railway: hence there has been a steady and uniform advance in agricultural development.  It is now fast becoming one of the great garden spots of the country.

 

What drainage is doing for this entire region is told in the article, “The Black Swamp,” under the head of Putnam County.  One single ditch in Wood county, the “Jackson Cut-off,” drains 30,000 acres, and cost $110,000.  It is therein stated that, counting in the railway ditches with the public and private ditches of the farmers, there are in Wood county alone 16,000 miles of ditches, at an aggre-

 

Page 859

 

gate cost of millions of dollars.  These are the basis of the great agricultural prosperity of the county in connection with the richness of the soil.  And later, comes the discovery and use of its great gas and oil resources to further enhance its prosperity.

 

EARLY HISTORY.

 

The following sketch of the early history of this region was communicated to our original edition by HEZEKIAH L. HOSMER, then a young lawyer of Perrysburg.  He eventually removed to the Pacific Slope, and held there a high judicial position.

 

The Military Expeditions against the Indian tribes in the West, commenced under the colonial government about the middle of the last century, were finally terminated on this river by the decisive victory of Gen. Wayne in 1794.  Previous to that event no portion of the West was more beloved by the Indians than the valleys of the Maumee and it tributaries.  In the daily journal of Wayne’s campaign, kept by George WILL, under date of Aug. 6, 1794, when the army was encamped fifty-six miles in advance of Fort Recovery, the writer says: “We are within six miles of the Auglaize river, and I expect to eat green corn to-morrow.” On the 8th of the same month, after the arrival of the army at the Camp Grand Auglaize (the site of Fort Defiance), he continues: “We have marched four or five miles in corn-fields down the Auglaize, and there is not less than 1,000 acres of corn around the town.”  This journal, kept from that time until the return of the army to Fort Greenville, is full of descriptions of the immense corn-fields, large vegetable patches, and old apple trees, found along the banks of the Maumee from its mouth to Fort Wayne.  It discloses the astonishing fact that for a period of eight days while building Fort Defiance, the army obtained their bread and vegetables from the corn-fields and potato patches surrounding the fort.  In their march from Fort Defiance to the foot of the rapids the army passed through a number of Indian towns composed of huts, constructed of bark and skins, which afforded evidence that the people who had once inhabited them were composed, not only of Indians, but of Canadian French and renegade Englishmen.

 

The Maumee Valley After Wayne’s Victory.—What the condition of the valley was for some years after Wayne’s campaign may be gathered from the following extracts from one of Judge BURNET’S letters, published by the Ohio Historical Society.  After assigning some reasons for the downfall of the Indians, he says: “My yearly trips to Detroit, from 1796 to 1802, made it necessary to pass through some of their towns, and convenient to visit many of them.  Of course I had frequent opportunities of seeing thousands of them, in their villages and at their hunting camps, and of forming a personal acquaintance with some of their distinguished chiefs.  I have eat and slept in their towns, and partaken of their hospitality, which had no limit but that of their contracted means.  In journeying more recently through the State, in discharging my judicial duties, I sometimes passed over the ground on which I had seen towns filled with happy families of that devoted race without perceiving the smallest trace of what had once been there.  All their ancient settlements on the route to Fort Defiance, and from thence to the foot of the rapids, had been broken up and deserted.

 

“The battle-ground of Gen. WAYNE, which I had often seen in the rude state in which it was when the decisive action of 1794 was fought, was so altered and changed that I could not recognize it, and not an indication remained of the very extensive Indian settlements which I had formerly seen there.  It seemed almost impossible that in so short a period such an astonishing change could have taken place.”

 

These extracts prove that even after the battle of Presque Isle, although crushed and humbled, the Indian refused to be divorced from the favorite home and numerous graves of his race.  A chain of causes which followed this battle finally wrested from him the last foothold of his soil.  These may be said to have commenced with the treaty of Greenville, made on the 3rd of August, 1795, with the Wyandots, Ottawas, and other tribes located in this region.  By this treaty, among various other cessions of territory, a tract of land twelve miles square at the foot of the rapids, and one of six miles square at the mouth of the river, were given to the United States.  This treaty was followed by the establishment of the boundaries of the county of Wayne, which included a part of the States of Ohio, Indiana and the whole of Michigan.

 

The First White Settler.—Notwithstanding this actual declaration of ownership by the government, few only of the whites of the country were willing to penetrate and reside in this yet unforsaken abode of the Indian.  Col. John ANDERSON was the first white trader of any notoriety on the Maumee.  He settled at Fort Miami as early as 1800.  Peter MANOR, a Frenchman, was here previous to that time, and was adopted by the chief Fontogany, by the name of Sawendebans, or “the Yellow Hair.”  MANOR, however, did not come here to reside until 1808.  Indeed, I cannot learn the names of any of the settlers prior to 1810 except the two above mentioned.  We may mention among those who came during the year 1810.  Maj. Amos SPAFFORD, Andrew RACE, Thomas LEAMING, Halsey W. LEAMING, James CARLIN, Wm. CARTER, George BLA-

 

Page 860

                          

LOCK, James SLASON, Samuel H. EWING, Jesse SKINNER, David HULL, Thomas DICK, Wm. PETERS, Ambrose HICKOX, Richard GIFFORD.  All these individuals were settled within a circumference of ten miles, embracing the amphitheatre of the foot of the rapids, as early as 1810.  Maj. Amos SPAFFORD came here to perform the duties of collector of the port of Miami.  He was also appointed deputy postmaster.  A copy of his return to the government as collector for the first quarter of his service, ending on the 30th June, 1810, shows the aggregate amount of exports to have been $5,640.85.  This was, for skins and furs, $5,610.85, and for twenty gallons of bear’s oil, $30.

 

When War Broke out in 1812 there were sixty-seven families residing at the foot of the rapids.  MANOR—or MINARD, the Frenchman above alluded to—states that the first intimation that the settlers had of Hull’s surrender at Detroit manifested itself by the appearance of a party of British and Indians at the foot of the rapids a few days after it took place.  The Indians plundered the settlers on both sides of the river, and departed for Detroit in canoes.  Three of their number remained with the intention of going into the interior of the State.  One of these was a Delaware chief by the name of Sac-a-manc.  MANOR won his confidence, under the pretence of friendship for the British, and was by him informed that in a few days a grand assemblage of all the northwestern tribes was contemplated at Fort Malden, and that in about two days after the assemblage a large number of British and Indians would be at the foot of the rapids, on their march to relieve Fort Wayne, then under investment by the American army, as was supposed.  He also informed him that, when they came again, they would massacre all the Yankees found in the Valley.  Sac-a-manc left for the interior of the State, after remaining a day at the foot of the rapids.

 

Flight of the Settlers.—The day after his departure MINARD called upon Maj. SPAFFORD, and warned him of the hostile intentions of the Indians, as he had received them from Sac-a-manc.  The major placed no confidence in them, and expressed a determination to remain until our army from the interior should reach this frontier.  A few days after this conversation a man by the name of GORDON was seen approaching the residence of Maj. SPAFFORD in great haste.  This individual had been reared among the Indians, but had, previous to this time, received some favors of a trifling character from Maj. SPAFFORD.  The major met him in his corn-field, and was informed that a party of about fifty Pottawatomies, on their way to Malden, had taken this route, and in less than two hours would be at the foot of the rapids.  He also urged the major to make good his escape immediately.  Most of the families at the foot of the rapids had left the village after receiving intelligence of Hull’s surrender.  The major assembled those that were left on the bank of the river, where they put in tolerable sailing condition an old barge, in which some officers had descended the river from Fort Wayne the year previous.  They had barely time to get such of their effects as were portable on board, and row down into the bend below the town, before they heard the shouts of the Indians above.  Finding no Americans here, the Indians passed on to Malden.  The major and his companions sailed in their crazy vessel down the lake to the Quaker settlement at Milan, on Huron river, where they remained until the close of the war.

 

Sac-a-manc, on his return from the interior of the State, a few days after the event, showed MANOR the scalps of three persons that he had killed during his absence, on Owl creek, near Mount Vernon.  At the time mentioned by him a detachment of the British army, under command of Col. ELLIOTT, accompanied by about 500 Indians, came to the foot of the rapids.  They were anxious to obtain guides.  MANOR feigned lameness and ignorance of the country above the head of the rapids, a distance of eighteen miles up the river.  By this means he escaped being pressed into their service above that point.  He accompanied them that far with his cart and pony, and was then permitted to return.  On his return, he met Col. ELLIOTT, the commander of the detachment, at the foot of Presque Isle Hill, who stopped him, and, after learning of the services he had performed, permitted him, with a curse, to go on.  A mile below him he met a party of about forty Pottawatomies, who also desired to know where he was going.  MAOR escaped being compelled to return by telling them he was returning to the foot of the rapids after forage for the army.  The British and Indians pursued their march up the river until they saw the American flag waving over Winchester’s encampment at Defiance, when they returned in double quick time to Canada.  On their return they burned the dwellings, stole the horses and destroyed the corn-fields of the settlers at the foot of the rapids.

 

MANOR, soon after his arrival at the foot of the rapids, went down the river to the British fleet, then lying at the mouth of Swan creek, under command of Capt. MILLS.  Here he reported himself, told what he had done for the army, and desired to leave to go to his family at the mouth of the river.  Capt. MILLS, having no evidence of his loyalty beyond his own word, put him under the hatches as a prisoner of war.  Through the aid of his friend, BEAUGRAND, MINARD was released in a few days, joined his family, and was afterwards a scout for our army during the remainder of the war.  He is now (1846) living at the head of the rapids, on a reservation of land granted him by the government, at the request of his Indian father, Ton-tog-sa-ny.  [Another account of Peter MANOR is in Lucas County.]

 

 

Page 861

 

of the citizens of our town were born in one of them.  The settlement of the valley was at first slow, but the foot of the rapids and vicinity was settled long before any of the rest.  In 1816 government sent an agent to lay out a town at the pint best calculated for commercial purposes.  That agent sounded the river from its mouth, and fixed upon Perrysburg.  The town was laid out that year, and named after Com. PERRY by Hon. Josiah MEIGS, then Comptroller of the Treasury.  This county was then embraced in the county limits of Logan county, Bellefontaine being the county-seat.  When the limits of Wood county were first determined, there was a great struggle between these three towns at the foot of the rapids—Orleans, Maumee and Perrysburg—for the county-seat.  The decision in favor of Perrysburg was the cause of the abandonment of the little town of Orleans, which soon after fell into decay.

 

The last remnant of the powerful Ottawa tribe of Indians removed from this valley west of the Mississippi in 1838.  They numbered some interesting men among them.  There was Nawash, Ockquenoxy, Charloe, Ottoca, Petonquet, men of eloquence, remembered by many of our citizens.  Their burying-grounds and village-sites are scattered along both banks of the river, from its mouth to Fort Defiance.

 

This part of the Maumee valley has been noted for military operations.  Wayne’s victory over the Indians (see Lucas County), Aug. 20, 1794, was gained within its borders.  It was also the theatre of important operations in the war of 1812.

 

March of Gen. Hull.—About the middle of June, 1812, the army of Hull left Urbana, and passed through the present counties of Logan, Hardin, Hancock and Wood, into Michigan.  They cut a road through the forest, and erected Forts M’Arthur and Findlay on the route, and arrived at the Maumee on the 30th of June, which they crossed at or near the foot of the rapids.  Hull surrendered at Detroit on the 16th  of the August following.

 

Tupper’s Expedition.—In the same summer, Gen. Edward W. TUPPER, of Gallia county, raised about 1,000 men for six months’ duty, mainly from Gallia, Lawrence and Jackson counties, who, under the orders of Gen. Winchester, marched from Urbana north by the route of Hull, and reached the foot of the Maumee rapids. The Indians appearing in force on the opposite bank, Tupper endeavored to cross the river with his troops in the night; but the rapidity of the current, and the feeble, half-starved condition of his men and horses were such, that the attempt failed.  The enemy soon after collected a superior force, and attacked TUPPER in his camp, but were driven off with considerable loss.  They returned to Detroit, and the Americans marched back to Fort M’Arthur.

 

Winchester’s Defeat.—On the 10th of January, 1813, Gen. Winchester, whose troops had been stationed at Forts Wayne and Defiance, arrived at the rapids, having marched from the latter along the north bank of the Maumee.  There they encamped until the 17th, when Winchester resumed his march north, and was defeated with great loss on the 22d, on the river Raisin, near the site of Monroe, Michigan.

 

On receiving information of Winchester’s defeat, Gen. Harrison sent Dr. McKEEHAN from Portage river with medicines and money to Malden, for the relief of the wounded and the prisoners.  He was accompanied by a Frenchman and a militia-man, and was furnished with a letter from Harrison, addressed to any British officer whom he might meet, describing his errand.  The night after they left they halted at the Maumee rapids to take a few hours’ sleep, in a vacant cabin upon the north bank of the river, about fifty rods north of the present bridge.  The cariole in which they raveled was left at the door, with a flag of truce set up in it.  They were discovered in the night by a party of Indians, accompanied, it is said, by a British officer; one of the men was killed, and the others taken to Malden, where the doctor was thrown into prison by PROCTOR and loaded with irons.

 

THE BUILDING OF FORT MEIGS.

 

After the defeat of Winchester, Gen. Harrison, about the first of February, established his advanced posts at the foot of the rapids.  He ordered Capt. WOOD, of the engineer corps, to fortify the position, as it was his intention to make this point his grand depot.  The fort erected was afterwards named Meigs, in honor of Governor Meigs.

 

Harrison ordered all the troops in the rear to join him immediately.  He was in hopes, by the middle of February, to advance upon Malden, and strike a blow that should in some measure retrieve the misfortunes that had befallen the American arms in this quarter.

 

On the 9th of February intelligence was brought of the encampment of about 600 Indians, twenty miles down, near the Bay shore.  Harrison had with him

 

Page 862

 

at this time about 2,000 men at the post.  The same night, or that following, 600 men left the fort under Harrison, and marched down the river on the ice twenty miles, when they discovered some fires on the north side of the river, which proved to have been that of the Indians who had fled the day before.  Here the detachment, which had been joined by 500 men more from the post, waited a few minutes, without having time to warm themselves, it being intensely cold, when the object of the expedition was made known.  This was to march after the Indians; and all those unable by fatigue to continue were ordered to follow the next day.  On resuming the line of march the army had proceeded only about two miles when their only cannon, with the horses attached, broke through the ice.  This was about two hours before morning, and the moon unfortunately was nearly down.  In endeavoring to extricate the horse, Lieut. Joseph H. LARIWILL, who had charge of the piece, with two of his men, broke through the ice and narrowly escaped drowning.  The army thereupon halted, and a company ordered to assist in recovering the cannon, which was not accomplished until daybreak.  Some of the men gave out from being wet, cold and fatigued; but the lieutenant, with the remainder, proceeded with the cannon after the main army, which they overtook shortly after sunrise, on an island near the mouth of the bay.  The spies were then arriving with the intelligence that the Indians had left the river Raisin for Malden.  Upon this the troops, having exhausted their provisions, returned, arriving at Fort Meigs just as the evening gun had been fired, having performed a march of forty-five miles on the ice in less than twenty-four hours.

 

LANGHAM’S DESPARATE ENTERPRISE.

 

A few hours after this, about 250 men volunteered to go on an enterprise of the most desperate nature.  On Friday, the 26th, the volunteer corps destined for this duty were addressed on parade by Gen. Harrison, who informed them that when  they had got a sufficient distance form the fort they were to be informed of the errand they were upon, and that all who then wished could return, but not afterwards.  He represented the undertaking as in a high degree one of peril and privation; but he promised that those who deported themselves in a gallant and soldierlike manner should be rewarded, and their names forwarded to the general government.

 

The corps took up their line of march and concentrated at what is now Lower Sandusky, where was then a block-house, on the site of Fort Stephenson, at that time garrisoned by two companies of militia.

 

The force, which was under command of Capt. LANGHAM, consisted of 68 regulars, 120 Virginia and Pennsylvania militia, 32 men under Lieut. MADISS, and 22 Indians, making, with their officers, 242 men; besides these were 24 drivers of sleds and several pilots.

 

On the morning of the 2d of March they left the block-house with six days’ provisions, and had proceeded about half a mile when Capt. LANGHAM ordered a halt.  He addressed the soldiers and informed them of the object of the expedition, which was to move down to Lake Erie and cross over the ice to Malden, and, in the darkness of night, to destroy with combustibles the British fleet and the public stores on the bank of the river.  This being done, the men were to retreat in their sleighs to the point of the Maumee bay, when their retreat was to be covered by a large force under Harrison.  At this time, independent of the garrison at Malden, in that vicinity was a large body of Indians, and it required a combination of circumstances to render the enterprise successful.  Capt. LANGHAM gave liberty for all who judged it too hazardous to withdraw.  Twenty of the militia and six or seven of the Indians availed themselves of the liberty.  The rest moved down the river in sleighs, and took the land on the west side of the bay, passing through and across the peninsula, and crossed at the bay of the Portage river, and soon came in view of the lake and its embosoming islands.  Some of the men

 

Page 863

 

walking out on the ice of the lake were alarmed by what was judged to be a body of men moving towards them.  It was subsequently discovered to be the rays of the sun, reflecting on ice thrown up in ridges.

 

The party encamped near the lake, and being without any tents, were thoroughly wet by the snow and rain.  After the guards were stationed, and all had retired to rest, the report of a musket was heard, and every man sprang to his post, ready for action.  It proved to have been a false alarm—an accidental discharge through the carelessness of one of the men.  Capt. LANGHAM was almost determined to have the soldier shot for his carelessness, as it had now become particularly necessary for the utmost precaution; but motives of humanity prevailed, and he was suffered to go unpunished.

 

On the next morning, March 3d, they proceeded on the ice to Middle Bass island, seventeen miles from their encampment.  Just before they left the lake shore an ensign and thirteen militia, one of the Indian chiefs and several of the Indians deserted them.  During their progress to the island the weather was stormy, wind blowing and snowing, and in places it was quite slippery.  They arrived at the northwest side of the island early in the afternoon, when the weather moderated.

 

In the course of the afternoon sled tracks were discovered on the ice, going in the direction of Malden.  They were presumed to have been made by two Frenchmen, who left Sandusky the day before the corps of LANGHAM.  They had then stated they were going to the river Huron, which was in an opposite direction: the officers now felt assured they were inimical to their designs, and were on their way to give the British notice of their intentions.  Moreover, to the north of the island on which they were the ice was weak and the lake appeared to be broken up to the north.

 

It being the intended route to go by the western Sister island, to elude the spies of the enemy, the guides gave it as their opinion that it was totally impossible to go to Malden; that the river Detroit and the lake from the middle Sister were doubtless broken up, and that there was a possibility of getting as far north as the middle Sister; but as the distance from that to the Detroit river, eighteen miles, had to be performed after night, they could not attempt going, being fully satisfied that they could not arrive at the point of destination, and as the weather was and had been soft, that, should a southerly wind blow up, the lake would inevitably break up, and they might be caught on it or one of the islands.  They then affirmed they had gone as far as they thought it either safe or prudent, and would not take the responsibility on them any farther.  Capt. LANGHAM called the guides and officers together.  He stated that he had been instructed to go no farther than the guides thought safe, asked the opinions of the officers, who unanimously decided that it was improper to proceed, and that they should return.

 

The weather having slightly improved, although still unfavorable, a second council was called of the officers and guides, but with the same result.  The captain then called the men and gave the opinion of their superiors, and presented the importance of the expedition to the government should they succeed; on the other hand, he represented that they might be lost on the lake by the breaking up of the ice, without rendering any service to their country, who would thus be deprived of the choice troops of the army.  The soldiers, on thus being called for their opinion, expressed themselves as ready to go wherever their officers would lead; at the same time said they should abide by the decision of their superiors, whose judgment was better than their own.

 

The party returned by way of Presque Isle, at which point they met Gen. Harrison with a body of troops.  From thence they proceeded to Fort Meigs in safety.  In the course of their journey back they found the lake open near the western Sister island.

 

On the 9th of March, the day being very fine, several of the men went down as far as the old British fort.  Some of them discovered a party of Indians, and gave the alarm.  The latter fired at them, and one man, while running, was shot through the left skirt of his coat.  Luckily, a hymn-book which he carried there received the ball, which was buried in its leaves.  The men escaped safely into the fort, but Lieut. WALKER, who was out hunting for wild fowl, was killed.  His body was found the next day and brought into the fort, where his grave is to be seen at the present day.

 

Harrison had determined, if possible, to regain Detroit, and in a measure atone for the disasters of the war in this quarter; but the weather had proved unfavorable for the transportation to Fort Meigs of a sufficient body of troops for such an object.  His force therefore was diminished, soon after his arrival, by the expiration of the term of service of a part of those at the rapids, and nothing more was left for him but to remain on the defensive.  Satisfied that, in his weakened condition, the enemy would make a descent from Malden upon the fort as soon as the ice broke up in the lake, he left in March for the interior, to hasten on all the troops he could raise to its defence.  On the 12th of April he returned at the head of a detachment of troops, and applied himself with great assiduity to completing the defences.

 

 

Page 864

 

returning to the fort they saw a solitary Indian, the sole survivor of his party, rise up in one of their two canoes and paddle to the shore.

 

All the foregoing is from the Journal of Lieut. LARWILL, who was one of Capt. LANGHAM’S party.

 

PLAN OF FORT MEIGS.

 

The annexed plan of Fort Meigs with its environs is from the survey of Lieut. Joseph H. LARWILL, made between the two sieges.  It was obtained directly from him for our first edition.  He was one of the original proprietors of Mansfield and also of Wooster.  He showed me some of his field books with entries of surveys of wild lands, with remarks upon soil timber.  If the woods were beech and sugar maple, it was certain it was first-class soil for wheat.  He was an old-style Jackson Democrat of positive convictions and declarations, and hated the British and Indians.  In the history of Wooster (see page 531) is told what a narrow escape my old friend LARWILL had from being blown up.  Luckily he lived to fight and help whip the British and their red-skinned allies and then made notes to show how they did it.

 

[Explanations.—a, grand battery, commanded by Capt. Daniel CUSHING; b, mortar battery; e, I, o, minor batteries; g, battery commanded at the second siege by Col. (now

 

FORT MEIGS AND ITS ENVIRONS.

 

 

Gen.) GAINES; e, magazines.  The black squares on the lines of the fort represent the position of the block-houses.  The dotted lines show the traverses, or walls of earth, thrown up.  The longest, the grand traverse, had a base of 20 feet, was 12 in height, and about 900 in length.  The traverses running lengthwise of the fort were raised as a protection against the batteries on the opposite side of the river, and those running crosswise were to defend them from the British batteries on this side.  The British batteries on the north side of the river were named as follows: a, queen’s; b, sailors’; d, kings’, and c, mortar.  The fort stood upon high ground, on the margin of a bank, elevated about sixty

 

Page 865

 

feet above the Maumee.  The surface is nearly level, and is covered by a green sward.  The outline of the fort is now (1846) well defined, and the grand traverse yet rises six or eight feet from the surrounding ground.  The work originally covered ten acres, but was reduced in area between the two sieges, to accommodate a smaller number of troops.  Just above, a large number of sunken graves indicate the locality of the soldiers’ burying-ground.  The graves of Lieut.  WALKER and Lieut. McCULLOUGH—the last of whom was shot while conversing with Gen. Harrison—are within the fort.  The first is surmounted by a small stone, with an inscription—the last is enclosed by a fence.  (See view of Maumee City, in Lucas County.)  To understand the position of Fort Meigs, with reference to the British fort and surrounding country, see map in Lucas County illustrating the battles of the Maumee country.

 

THE SIEGE OF FORT MEIGS.

 

“On the breaking up of the ice in Lake Erie, General PROCTOR, with all his disposable force, consisting of regulars and Canadian militia from Malden, and a large body of Indians under their celebrated chief, Tecumseh, amounting in the whole to two thousand men, laid siege to Fort Meigs.  To encourage the Indians, he had promised them an easy conquest, and assured them that General Harrison should be delivered up to Tecumseh.  On the 26th of April the British columns appeared on the opposite bank of the river, and established their principal batteries on a commanding eminence opposite the fort.  On the 27th the Indians crossed the river, and established themselves in the rear of the American lines.  The garrison, not having completed their wells, had no water except what they obtained from the river, under a constant firing of the enemy.  On the first, second and third of May their batteries kept up an incessant shower of balls and shells upon the fort.  On the night of the third the British erected a gun and mortar battery on the left bank of the river, within two hundred and fifty yards of the American lines.  The Indians climbed the trees in the neighborhood of the fort, and poured in a galling fire upon the garrison.  In this situation General Harrison received a summons from PROCTOR for a surrender of the garrison, greatly magnifying his means of annoyance; this was answered by a prompt refusal, assuring the British general that if he obtained possession of the fort, it would not be by capitulation.*  Apprehensive of such an attack, General Harrison had made the governors of Kentucky and Ohio minutely acquainted with his situation, and stated to them the necessity of reinforcements for the relief of Fort Meigs.  His requisitions had been zealously anticipated, and General CLAY was at this moment descending the Miami with twelve hundred Kentuckians for his relief.

 

“At twelve o’clock in the night of the fourth an officer⁺ arrived from General

__________________

*”The conversation which took place between General Harrison and Major Chambers, of the British army, was, as nearly as can be recollected, as follows:--   

“Major Chambers.—General Proctor has directed me to demand the surrender of this post.  He wishes to spare the effusion of blood.

“General Harrison.—The demand, under present circumstances, is a most extraordinary one.  As General Proctor did not send me a summons to surrender on his first arrival, I had supposed that he believed me determined to do my duty.  His present message indicates an opinion of me that I am at a loss to account for.

“Major Chambers.—General Proctor could never think of saying anything to wound your feelings, sir.  The character of General Harrison, as an officer, is well known.  General Proctor’s force is very respectable, and there is with him a larger body of Indians than has ever before been embodied.

“General Harrison.—I believe I have a very correct idea of General Proctor’s force; it is not such as to create the least apprehension for the result of the contest, whatever shape he may be pleased hereafter to give to it.  Assure the general, however, that he will never have this post surrendered to him on any terms.  Should it fall into his hands, it will be in a manner calculated to do him more honor, and to give him larger claims upon the gratitude of his government, than any capitulation could possibly do.”

 

+ This messenger was Capt. William Oliver. now (1846) of Cincinnati, then a young man,

 

Page 866

 

Clay, with the welcome intelligence of his approach, stating that he was just above the rapids, and could reach him in two hours, and requesting his orders.  Harrison determined on a general sally, and directed Clay to land eight hundred men on the right bank, take possession of the British batteries, spike their cannon, immediately return to their boats, and cross over to the American fort.  The remainder of Clay’s forces were ordered to land on the left bank, and fight their way to the fort, while sorties were to be made from the garrison in aid of these operations.  Captain Hamilton was directed to proceed up the river in a periauger, land a subaltern on the left bank, who should be a pilot to conduct General Clay to the fort; and then cross over and station his periauger at the place designated for the other division to land.  General Clay, having received these orders, descended the river in order of battle in solid columns, each officer taking position according to his rank.  Colonel Dudley, being the eldest in command, led the van, and was ordered to take the men in the twelve front boats, and execute General Harrison’s orders on the right bank.  He effected his landing at the place designated, without difficulty.  General Clay kept close along the left bank until he came opposite the place of Colonel Dudley’s landing, but not finding the subaltern there, he attempted to cross over and join Col. Dudley; this was prevented by the violence of the current on the rapids, and he again attempted to land on the left bank, and effected it with only fifty men amid a brisk fire from the enemy on shore, and made his way to the fort, receiving their fire until within the protection of its guns.  The other boats, under the command of Colonel Boswell, were driven farther down the current, and landed on the right to join Colonel Dudley.  Here they were ordered to re-embark, land on the left bank, and proceed to the fort.  In the meantime two sorties were made from the garrison, one on the left, in aid of Colonel Boswell, by which the Canadian militia and the Indians were defeated, and he enabled to reach the fort in safety, and one on the right against the British batteries, which was also successful.*

 

“Colonel Dudley, with his detachment of eight hundred Kentucky militia,

______________________

+noted for his heroic bravery.  He had previously been sent from the fort at a time when it was surrounded by Indians, through the wilderness, with instructions to General Clay.  His return to the fort was extremely dangerous.  Captain Leslie Coombs, now of Lexington, Ky., had been sent by Colonel Dudley to communicate with Harrison.  He approached the fort, and when within about a mile was attacked by the Indians, and after a gallant resistance was foiled in his object and obliged to retreat with the loss of nearly all of his companions.  Oliver managed to get into the fort through the cover of the darkness of the night, by which he eluded the vigilance of Tecumseh and his Indians, who were very watchful and had closely invested it.—H.H.

 

*”The troops in this attack on the British battery were commanded by Col. John Miller, of the 19th United States regiment, and consisted of about 250 of the 17th and 19th Regiments, 100 twelve-month volunteers, and Captain Seebre’s company of Kentucky militia.  They were drawn up in a ravine under the east curtain of the fort, out of reach of the enemy’s fire; but to approach the batteries it was necessary, after having ascended from the ravine, to pass a plain of 200 yards in width, in the woods beyond which were the batteries protected by a company of grenadiers, and another of light infantry, upwards of 200 strong.  These troops were flanked on the right by two or three companies of Canadian militia, and on the left by a large body of Indians under Tecumseh.  After passing along the ranks and encouraging the men to do their duty, the general placed himself upon the battery of the right rear angle, to witness the contest.  The troops advanced with loaded but trailed arms.  They had scarcely reached the summit of the hill when they received the fire of the British infantry.  It did them little harm; but the Indians being placed in position, and taking sight or aim, did great execution.  They had not advanced more than fifty yards on the plain before it became necessary to halt and close the ranks.  This was done with as much order by word of command from the officers as if they had been on parade.  The charge was then made, and the enemy fled with so much precipitation that although many were killed none were taken.  The general, from his position on the battery, seeing the direction that a part of them had taken, despatched Major Todd with the reserve of about fifty regulars, who quickly returned with two officers and forty-three non-commissioned officers and privates.  In this action the volunteers and militia suffered less than the regulars, because from their position the latter were much sooner unmasked by the hill, and received the first fire of the enemy.  It was impossible that troops could have behaved better than they did upon this sortie.”