At the time of my last annual report, Oct. 1, 1867, I was a member of the Peace Commission on which the Congress of the United States had devolved the whole Indian question, for a practical, and, if possible, a peaceful solution. At the same time, by an Executive order, it was made my military duty to subordinate the acts of all the troops subject to my command to whatever plan of action the Peace Commissioners might adopt. The Commission, in its annual report last December to the President of the United States, bears full testimony on this point, to the effect that all the officers of the army and all the troops with whom they came in contact had fully and cheerfully cooperated with them in their efforts to bring this difficult business to a peaceful conclusion. I need not here refer to the deliberations and acts of that Commission further than to state that its members were unanimous in the conclusion that to maintain a permanent peace with the Indians east of the Rocky Mountains they should all, at the earliest possible moment, be collected on reservations as far removed as possible from the white settlements and lines of travel; and that there they should be maintained at the cost of the United States until they could wholly or partially provide for themselves. The two principal reservations indicated by the Commission were north of the State of Nebraska and west of the Missouri River, and south of the State of Kansas and west of Arkansas. These districts are the only parts of our vast national domain at all adapted to the purpose not already appropriated. The Commission further recommended that for each of these reservations a sort of government should be provided by law, looking to a time in future when all the Indians would be reduced to the peaceful condition of shepherds, herders and farmers. The general plan was justified by the then state of facts, and its wisdom has been demonstrated by more recent events. A sense of national justice dictates that in taking from these savages the lands whose wild game has hitherto fed, clothed and sheltered them, we should, in restricting them to the exclusive use of a part, make them a compensation of some sort for the remainder, and, if possible, procure their consent. Influenced by this consideration, the Peace Commissioners, during the Fall and Winter of 1867, and the Spring and Summer of 1868, held councils with all, or nearly all, the tribes and parts of tribes east of the Rocky Mountains, making liberal provisions for all the appointed places of council, according to the terms and ceremonies to which they were long accustomed. Formal written treaties were made with each separate tribe, signed with all the formality, and transmitted to the Senate of the United States for ratification. The treaties with the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches, Navajoes and Crows were duly confirmed, but those with the various bands of Sioux, Snakes, &c., were not confirmed, simply, it is inferred, because they were not complete when the Senate adjourned. But for some reason the Congress did not take any action on the chief proposition of the Peace Commission, which was embraced in their report of last December, viz.: that which related to the setting apart of the two reservations hereinbefore referred to, and providing government therefor, which was designed to precede the confirmation of any of the treaties, and was the only vital principle of them all. I felt compelled to refer to this fact because many persons attribute to it the reason why we failed to secure a lasting peace, and why we are at this moment engaged in a costly war with four of the principal tribes with which we had to deal viz.: the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas and Comanches.

    It has always been most difficult to uncover the exact truth concerning the cause of a rupture with any Indians. They never give notice beforehand of a warlike intention; and the first notice comes after their rifles and lances have done much bloody work. All intercourse then necessarily cease, and the original cause soon becomes buried in after events. The present Indian war in Gen. SHERIDAN'S department is no exception, and as near as I can gather it, the truth is about this: Last year, in the several councils held at North Platte and Fort Laramie, by the Peace Commissioners with the fragmentary bands of the Sioux, the Indians asserted that they were then, and had been always anxious to live in peace with their white neighbors, provided we kept faith with them. They claimed that the building of the Powder River Road, and the establishment of military posts along it, drove away the game from the only hunting grounds they had left, after our occupation of Montana and Nebraska; that this road had been built in the face of their protest, and in violation of some old treaty, which guaranteed them that country forever; that road and the military posts along it had been constructed in 1866 and 1867 for the benefit of the people of Montana, but had almost ceased to be of any practical use to them, by reason of the building of the Union Pacific Railroad, whose terminus west of the Black Hills made it easier for the wagons to travel by another and better road west of the mountains. For this reason, and because of the further extension of the railroad, under rapid progress, would each year make the Powder River Road less and less used, the Commission yielded to the earnest entreaty of the Sioux and recommended the abandonment for the time of this road. On the 2d day of last March Gen. GRANT gave the necessary orders for breaking up the posts of Forts Reno, Philip Kearney and C. F. Smith, but it was well toward August before the stores and material could be hauled away. As we had reason to apprehend, some of the Sioux attributing our action to fear, followed up our withdrawal by raids to the line of the Pacific Road, and to the south of it into Colorado. Others of them doubtless reached the camps of the Arapahoes on Beaver Creek, and the Cheyenne camps on Pawnee Fork, near Fort Larned, and told them what had occurred, and made them believe by war, or threats of war, they too could compel us to abandon the Smoky Hill line, which passes through the very heart of the buffalo region, the best hunting grounds of America. About this time, viz, Aug. 3 or 4, a party of Indians, composed of 200 Cheyennes, four Arapahoes and twenty Sioux, are known to have started from their camps on Pawnee Fork on a war expedition, nominally to fight the Pawnees. On the 10th they appeared on the Saline, north of Fort Harker, where the settlers received them kindly. They were given food and coffee, but, pretending to be offended because it was in tin cups, they threw it back in the faces of the women, and began at once to break up furniture and set fire to the houses. They seized the women and ravished them, perpetrating atrocities which could only have been the result of premeditated crime. Here they killed two men; thence they crossed over to the settlements on the Solomon where they continued to destroy the houses and property, to ravish all females, and killed thirteen men. Going on to the Republican they killed two more men, and committed other acts of similar brutal atrocity. As soon as intelligence of this could be carried to Fort Hawker troops were sent in pursuit, who succeeded in driving them away, rescuing some captive children, and killing but few Indians, by reason of their fast ponies and familiarity with the country.

    I recite those facts with some precision, because they are proven beyond dispute, and up to the very moment of their departure from Pawnee Fork no Indian alleges any but the kindest treatment on the part of the agents of the General Government, of our soldiers, or of the frontier people, with one exception, Agent LEAVENWORTH. The soldiers not only from a natural aversion to an Indian war; which will work no glory, but under positive orders from me, had borne with all manner of insult and provocation, in hope that very soon the Peace Commission would culminate in the withdrawal of the savages from the neighborhood of our posts, roads and settlements, and thereby end all further trouble. I was at Fort Leavenworth when Gen. SHERIDAN received notice of the attacks on the settlers of the Saline, Solomon and Republican. He started at once up the road, made every inquiry, and was satisfied our people had given no provocation at all for those wanton acts of barbarity, which was in flagrant violation of their recent treaties. Yet he delayed striking their camps till he had made a formal demand, through the agent, according to the terms of the treaty, for the actual perpetrators of these very acts. Col. WYNCOOP, agent of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, sent a messenger out and made every exertion to procure their surrender, but utterly failed of success, for it seems the older and more cautious chiefs, though claiming to desire peace, could not give up so considerable a body of their best young warriors, and of course they all became responsible. All of the Cheyennes at once began a general war along the Smoky Hill and Arkansas Roads, simultaneously attacked every party of white men who had not received a notice of the change in their peaceful relations, and who were, therefore, unprepared for attack. The aggregate murders amounted to seventy-nine in August and September. Gen. SHERIDAN seeing that war with the Cheyennes was inevitable, then endeavored to keep the Arapahoes out of it. This tribe had been camped for the Summer on Beaver Creek, and he invited their chiefs into Fort Dodge, where, on the 3d of September, he met Little Beaver, Spotted Wolf, Bull Bear and other Arapahoe chiefs, well known to our officers, and in full council these agreed to keep out of the war, and to move down to the reservation below the Kansas line, to which they had assented at the Medicine Lodge Council. When the time appointed by themselves to come in and to start for Fort Cobb had transpired, they not only did not come in, but were known to be at open war all the way from Fort Wallace to Denver, in Colorado, the very opposite direction. In like manner Gen. W. B. HAZEN, whom I had appointed to take charge of the Lower or Southern Reservation met the Kiowas and Comanches at Fort Zarah, on the 22d of September, and agreed to feed and maintain them en route and after they had reached their reservation, near Fort Cobb. But when the time came for them to move they did not go, but were also known to be engaged with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes in the common war. Nevertheless, by orders, Gen. HAZEN has gone to Fort Cobb to fulfill our treaty stipulations with than, and I can imagine no other reason for this conduct than their supposed belief that by war they can force us to abandon their favorite buffalo range, as we have already abandoned to the Sioux the Powder River country.

    To show the concurrence of action and simultanity of hostile acts on the part of these tribes of Indians, in addition to the report of Gens. SHERIDAN and AUGUR herewith transmitted, I transcribe in the report extracts of telegraphic messages from the Governors of Colorado and Kansas. Acting Gov. HALL telegraphed me from Denver, under date of Aug. 27: "We are completely surrounded by hostile Indians, extending from Cheyenne Wells and South Park, south, to Julesburg, north, estimated at 600 warriors. From reliable information twelve people have been killed thus far." On the 4th September Gov. HUNT telegraphed me from Denver: "Just returned. Fearful condition of things here. Nine person murdered by Indians yesterday within a radius of sixty miles," &c. And on the 24th of September Acting Gov. HALL telegraphed from Denver: "The Indians have again attacked our settlement in strong force, obtaining possession of the country to within twelve miles of Denver. They are more bold, fierce and desperate in their assaults than ever before. It is impossible to drive them out and protect the families at the same time, for they are better armed, mounted, disciplined and better officered than our men. Each hour brings intelligence of fresh barbarities and more extensive robberies," &c. On the 4th of September, Gov. CRAWFORD, of Kansas, telegraphed from Topeka: "Have just received a dispatch from HAYS, stating that the Indians attacked, captured and burned a train at Pawnee Fork, and killed, scalped, and burned sixteen men; also, attacked another train at Cimarron Crossing, which was defended until the ammunition was exhausted, when the men abandoned the train, saving what stock they could. Similar attacks are of almost of daily occurrence. These things must cease; I cannot disregard constant and persistent appeals for help; I cannot furnish you all the troops necessary; I cannot sit idly by and see our people butchered; but as a last resort will be obliged to call upon the State force to take the field and end these outrages. I will at once organize two cavalry regiments of picked men, well mounted, for volunteer service. Will you accept them?" All this time Gen. SHERIDAN in person was laboring, with every soldier of his command, to give all possible protection to the scattered people in that wide range of country from Kansas to Colorado and New-Mexico. But the very necessity of guarding interests so widely scattered, made it impossible to spare enough troops to go in search of the Indians in their remote camps. On his requisition I applied to Gen. GRANT for more cavalry, and by his orders seven companies of the Fifth Cavalry, under Major ROWELL, were collected from Virginia, North Carolina and Tennessee, and despatched to Kansas. On a further call, the Secretary of War (Gen. SCHOFIELD,) on the 6th of October authorized the acceptance of one mounted regiment of Kansas Volunteers for six months. These latter troops are not yet mustered in, but Gen. SHERIDAN expects to have them in the field in November. With these troops he expects, during this Winter, to punish the hostile Indians in his Department, so that they will not again resort to war, and such as are not killed will be collected by force on their reservation, and made to remain there. I will not attempt to describe the many expeditions that have already been made, but for details refer you to Gen. SHERIDAN'S report. They have necessarily been of a cursive and somewhat unsatisfactory character, because the Indians can scatter so long as their ponies can get grass everywhere, but as soon as Winter compels them to collect together in villages, I believe that Gen. SHERIDAN'S troops will be able to find them and to destroy all that other resistance.

    It is idle for us longer to attempt to occupy the Plains in common with these Indians, for the country is not susceptible of close settlement with farms like Missouri and Iowa, and is solely adapted to grazing. All of our people are necessarily scattered, and have more or less cattle and horses, which tempt the Indians, hungry, and it may be, starving for the want of his accustomed game, and he will steal rather than starve, and to steal he will not hesitate to kill. Therefore, a joint occupation of that district of the country by these two classes of people with such opposing interests, is a simple impossibility, and the Indians must yield. The Peace Commission has assigned them a reservation, which, if held for fifty years, will make their descendants rich, and in the meantime they are promised food while they are learning to cultivate the earth and to rear tame stock. To labor with their own hands, or even to remain in one place, militates with all the hereditary pride of the Indian, and force must be used to accomplish this result. It was for this reason the Peace Commission, at its Chicago session, in October, after the events before described had occurred, and were known to them, was forced to the conclusion that the management of Indian affairs should be transferred back to the War Department, where it belonged, prior to 1849. That Department of our Government is the only one that can use force promptly without the circumlocution now necessary; and no other Department of our Government can act with promptness and vigor enough to give any hope that the plans and purposes of the Peace Commission will be carried out. Even then, there is doubt that the Indians themselves will make the necessary personal efforts to succeed. And I fear that they will at last fall back upon our hands a mere mass of helpless paupers. I am fully aware that many of our good people, far removed from contact with these Indians, and dwelling with a painful interest on the past events, such as are described to have occurred in Minnesota in 1863, and at the Chivington massacre of 1864, believe that the whites are always in the wrong, and that the Indians have been forced to resort to war in self-defence, by actual want or by reason of our selfishness.

    I am more than convinced that such is not the case in the present instance, and hope I have made it plain. I further believe that the only hope of saving any part of these Indians from utter annihilation is by a fair and prompt execution of the scheme suggested by the Peace Commission, which can alone be done by Congress, with the concurrence of the Indians themselves. Even then it will require much patience and hard labor on the part of the officers who execute the plan, which I do not wish to assume myself or impose on other army officers; but it is certain that the only hope to find any end of this eternal Indian war is in the transfer of the entire business to the War Department, and for Congress to enact the laws and provide the necessary money at least a year before it is required to be expended. This is especially necessary in the case of the Sioux, because the Missouri river is only navigable in early Summer. It is true that in the annual Appropriation bill, approved July 27, 1868, (and which did not become public till the Cheyennes had actually started on the war-path, viz., August 3,) there was a clause giving half a million of dollars to be disbursed under my direction, as a member of the Peace Commission, for carrying out the treaty stipulations, making and preparing homes, furnishing provisions, tools and farming utensils, and furnishing food for such bands of Indians with which treaties had been made and, not yet ratified, and in defraying the expenses of the Commission in making such treaties and carrying their provisions into effect. As soon as I got a copy of this bill, viz.: Aug. 10, I issued my General Orders No. 4, a copy of which is herewith inclosed, in hopes that by its provisions I could prevent the difficulties already begun in Kansas from spreading to the powerful and dangerous tribe of Sioux at the North. This clause in the Appropriation bill made no change whatever in the general management of Indians with whom treaties had been made and confirmed, which, as before, remained wholly with the Interior Department. Upon application to Gen. JOHN B. SANBORN, the member of the Peace Commission who had been its disbursing agent, I received a list of the outstanding accounts against that Commission, amounting to about $150,000. I therefore retained that sum of money, and have dispersed thereof the sum of $141,750.l9, leaving in my hands at this date a balance of $8,219.19, applicable to the few items of account still outstanding.

    The balance of the appropriations, viz., $350,000, was distributed as follows: To Gen. W. S. HARNEY for the Sioux, $200,000; to Gen. W. B. HAZEN, for the Cheyennes, &c., $50,000; to Gen. C. C. AUGUR, for the Snakes, &c., $50,000: and to Major R. C. LA MOTTE, for the Crows, $50,000; total, $350,000. That the Indians will receive the benefit of every cent of this money I know; and the high character of these officers, and their peculiar fitness to the trust named will, I feel assured, carry conviction to all that the disbursement of this money will be in full harmony with the designs and purposes of the Peace Commission and of Congress. In the same Appropriation bill were two other items of expenditures intrusted to my official supervision viz.: $200,000 for seeds, farming and implements, work cattle and other stock, provided for in article seven of the treaty with the Navajo Indians of New-Mexico; $12,500 for constructing a warehouse, agency building, blacksmith, and carpenter shop and schoolhouse for the same tribe, (Navajoes.) The whole of the appropriation, viz., $212,500 has been transferred to Gen. GEO. W. GETTY, commanding in New-Mexico, who will see that it is properly applied. There was another item of appropriation in the same bill, viz.: $150,000 for the removal of the Navajoes from their old reservation at Bosque Redondo to their present reservation near old Fort Defiance, which was subject to the control of the Interior Department, but before the Appropriation bill passed, these Indians had actually been removed by my military orders, given on the spot, at a cost to the army of less than $50,000, and I am at a loss to know if this money can be refunded to the army out of the appropriation referred to.

    I expect to receive from the several officers named in my General Orders No. 4, and to lay before the War Department before the close of this year a full census of all the Indians for whom they are required to provide, with carefully prepared estimates of funds needed to perfect the system thus begun by them, after which they can be transferred back to their civil agents or retained according to whatever action Congress may take this Winter on the several recommendations of the Indian Commission. But knowing the pressing necessities of some of these Indians at this moment I would ask an early appropriation of $300,000 for Gen. HARNEY, and $200,000 for Gen. HAZEN. I deem these sums indispensible to provide for the peaceful Indians this Winter, and to enable them to make a fair beginning next Spring in their farming operations on the reservations to which they have been or may be removed.

    In conclusion, I will remark that I propose to continue, as now, to have Gens. PERRY and AUGUR protect the Missouri River traffic and the Union Pacific Road with zealous care, and so gather in all the wandering bands of Sioux to the reservation north of Nebraska, where Gen. W. S. HARNEY is prepared to feed and protect them to the extent of the means subject to my control, and destroy or punish the hostile Indians of his department, till they of their own volition will go to Fort Cobb and remain there on the reservation assigned them, under the care of Gen. W. B. HAZEN, who is also prepared, to a limited extent, to provide for their necessities. This double process of peace within their reservations and war without must soon bring this matter to some conclusion.                W. T. SHERMAN,
                                                    Lieutenant-General.

Source:

Unknown, "The Indians. Gen. Sherman's Report--The Indian War--Its Cause and Extent--What Should be Done With the Tribes," The New York Times, New York, Saturday, 21 November 1868, p. 1.